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June 27, 2007 (the date of publication in Russian)

Arkady Maler

RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN THE HOLY LAND

Could religious warfare in Palestine be ceased?

Russia is only entering the stage of comprehensive recognition of its own interests in the Middle East. The same is true for other foreign policy directions, as Russia has not yet determined the basic principles of its geopolitical doctrine in the universal dimension – despite the urgent necessity of this task, at the face of mounting external and internal challenges.

Overcoming the impact of Yeltsin's period, today's Russia returns to the practice of continental imperial policy, which is intrinsic for the nation. Still, a detailed and systemic vision of the nation's geopolitical priorities in various regions of the world has not yet established. This especially concerns the Middle East, where Russia's foreign policy potential is not yet fully developed.

In their efforts to elaborate an efficient foreign policy approach towards the reality of the Middle East, Russian politicians often rely upon the assumption that one of the key players in the area, Israel, is a blindly obedient partner or instrument of US strategic policies. However, this view is considerably erroneous.

First of all, the national interests of the United States and Israel can't completely coincide by definition, as these nations are too different. Secondly, the Jewish lobby in American policy, frequently described as a preterhuman force, has been serving as a channel for the interests of the diaspora rather than the smaller part of the Jewish people which once decided to exchange the conveniences of the West for life in a sweltering and insecure region.

Moreover, the diaspora itself – which has spent decades to adapt itself for the very idea of Israeli statehood in the historical Judea – is becoming more and more divided into the orthodox and leftist-liberal factions, the latter permanently accusing a presumably imperialistic Israel of oppression of presumably peaceful Arabic population.

 

A FRAGMENT OF EUROPE IN ASIA

In fact, the United States has been pursuing a very diversified and multi-move policy, is major satellite in the region being not Israel, but the Wahhabite kingdom of Saudi Arabia – the essential "capital country” of the Middle East and the crucial source of oil for the world's largest energy consumer. Other long-term satellites have been – for the same and other reasons – Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.

Egypt, the largest of the Arabic countries, and Turkey, a strategic member of NATO, have enjoyed financial and political support from Washington for decades. The policy of these countries is increasingly important for the United States at the face of an obvious strategic failure in Iraq.

In this context, the real geopolitical importance of Israel for the United States is not very significant, being determined more by factors of religion and culture than strategic policies. The religious substantiation emerges from the view that the territory which includes Jerusalem, the center of attraction for both Christians and Moslems, should be kept under political control. The civilizational substantiation gives tribute to Israel's level of economic and social development which enables the country to be viewed as a fragment of the European civilization – to a larger extent than the EU candidate Turkey.

 

RUSSIA-ISRAEL: ARGUMENTS FOR RAPPROCHEMENT

What ultimate goals should Russia pursue in the Middle East? First of all, regardless from Russia's own religious identity as such, Moscow is uninterested in a further expansion of radical Islam in the northern direction. This fact is understood today in Russia equally by conservative, socialist and liberal thinkers. Similar concerns are shared by many Europeans, reluctant to support the project of the EU Constitution from fears that Europe might become one more "united Emirate".

From this standpoint, Israel's role is unique, as it is the only country in the region which distracts the dreams of Islamic expansion from a "great move to the North". Still, Russia has got one more significant priority in the Jewish state.

Russia is interested in a humanitarian dialogue with Israel for the purpose of re-establishing its presence in the Holy Land. This objective is perfectly substantiated in the cultural context. Already Metropolitan Antonius Khrapovitsky urged Russia to make the Holy Land the stronghold of its policy. The same idea was pursued by the active pilgrimage policy of the Imperial Palestinian Society. If the 1917 revolution were avoided, Russia's presence in the Holy Land would be much stronger.

Russia's geocultural self-identification as the Third Rome, the leading subject of Orthodox Christian expansion, is logically leading to the assumption that the territory of Israel should be regarded as an object of Russian interests with all the ensuing consequences.

 

TWO SUBJECTS FOR A DIALOGUE

Today, Israel is Russia's natural ally in two issues which are not yet fully recognized. Firstly, the role of Israel as an obstacle for Islamic expansion is essential for several directions of Russian foreign policy – exactly in those directions where the United States and Israel essentially disagree in strategic approach.

In particularly, Israel was not at all interested in disintegration of Yugoslavia and the later emergence of the artificial Moslem republics of Bosnia and Kosovo. Israel openly expressed protest against the missile attack on Belgrade, as well as the US support of Albania – a fact often underestimated in Moscow and newly recognized in Belgrade. Similarly, Israel was one of the few countries which supported Russia in its effort to crush the separatist radical Islamic regime in Chechnya which enjoyed support from Arabic warlords, absorbed Wahhabite theology, and was committed to expand to the Caspian.

Secondly, Israel is the only state which is uninterested in revision of the post-World War II architecture of Europe to the same extent as Russia. This similarity emerges not just from the fact that in the earlier architecture, the state of Israel did not exist at all. The issue exceeds merely geographic aspects, expanding into the sphere of ideology. Devaluation of the Holocaust, as an indispensable element of state ideology, is as unacceptable for Israel in the same way as equaling of Stalinism to Nazism is unacceptable for Russia. One can just imagine the whole range of geopolitical implications of a possible shift in the EU policy which would enable some Baltic politicians to openly declare that the liberation of Auschwitz (Oswiecim) by the Soviet Army is not related to the "common European destiny". It is equally obvious that in the inevitable upsurge of ethnic nationalism in Europe, the attitude towards Russia from both sides of the conflict is likely to be as indifferent as to the issue of the Holocaust.

 

SECULARIZATION AS A PREFERABLE OPTION

What would be the optimum choice of Russian policy in the Middle East with regard of the above mentioned circumstances? Certainly, Russia's ultimate goal to establish its stronghold in the region is unattainable in the atmosphere of increased fundamentalist sentiment from both the Arabic and Jewish sides. Therefore, Russia is interested – though this may sound controversial – in gradual secularization of both the Zionist and Arabist regimes. Beyond Westernization, this process would clear the coast for implementation of Orthodox Christian projects in the region. In this respect, secular Zionism is preferable to Arabic Islamism; similarly, secular Arabism is preferable to Jewish fundamentalism. This system of co-ordinates seems most favorable for Russia in the Middle East.

At the same time, it has to be understood that the possibility of emergence of secular democratic regimes in the Middle East's Arabic countries should not be overestimated. The elites of these countries are not ready for this change; for relevant reasons, Palestine hasn't yet emerged as an independent state in the design which Edward Said, an American-Palestinian cultural expert, had been dreaming of. Despite generous financial support from the United States and the EU, the situation in Palestine has not much improved since the day of the official recognition of Palestinian statehood by Israel in accordance with the Oslo agreements.

Only a stage-by-stage and purposive secularization of the Palestinian community, along with channelizing the religious conflict into a pragmatic nationalist dimension would provide an opportunity for durable conciliation and for the start of a purely political dialogue. Unless this happens, ethnic-religious tensions in the Middle East would only exacerbate.

In the current situation, the failed Palestinian statehoods being practically divided into two, controlled by Fatah on the West Bank of Jordan River, and by Hamas in the Gaza sector, it would make more sense for Russia to deal with the national-secular Fatah. At the same time, we have to admit that this movement is unable to cease fundamentalist expansion – as well as the fact that the mutual hatred between the two Palestinian sides is sometimes more significant for both of them than the negation of Israel.


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