July 02, 2007 (the date of publication in Russian)
Yaroslav Butakov
CHAVEZ'S CHALLENGE
Does Russia need to combat global imperialism?
The latest visit of Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez to Russia has aroused strong repercussion for two reasons. The first of them is the effort of nationalization of the Venezuelan oil and gas industry, resolutely undertaken by Chavez on the background of increased tensions with Washington. The second circumstance is the present chill in Russia's own relations with the United States, viewed by many experts as a preface to a new Cold War or even its onset. It is noteworthy that none of the earlier four (!) visits of Chavez to Russia was echoed with such a global hullabaloo as the present one.
Chavez's characteristic of Russia as a "dear" and "cognate" land, as well as proliferation of military contracts between Moscow and Caracas, and the supposed replacement of Western corporations by Russian companies in Venezuelan – especially oil extracting – industry, is widely perceived as an element of Russia's imperial revenge or even an offensive, through buildup of a stronghold in Washington's underbelly. In many Russians, this ostensibility produces an impression that their country is safely back in 1962, when the US leadership was seriously upset over the deployment of Soviet missiles on the isle of Cuba.
A GLOBAL-SCALE LEADER
During the last years, Hugo Chavez has established himself as more than a national leader. Securing conditions for real economic sovereignty, he is vigorously organizing international support for his domestic policies. Moreover, he is building up an international forefront, involving all the nations dissatisfied with the imperial manners of the United States. Among them, Russia and China would look most formidable. Chavez's policy is based upon a presently massive anti-imperialistic sentiment among the majority of ordinary Ibero-Americans.
Today, Chavez is making use of the natural advantages of his country as the region's largest producer of energy resources, successfully converting this geoeconomic potential into political capital. In the new design of the Western hemisphere, which Chavez intends to implement, Venezuela definitely acquires the role of the "energy superpower", whose infrastructure projects, based upon Venezuela's hydrocarbon potential, materialize the leading mission in the whole anti-imperialistic (i.e. anti-Washington) front. In this design, Chavez, as the “father” of this strategic nation, would emerge as an exceptionally influential figure.
Hugo Chavez fascinates Russian leftists with his thoroughgoing resoluteness, displayed in his fight with large-scale, primarily transnational capitals. In their turn, Russian rightist politicians are charmed with his devotion to national interests, his stake upon independence, and his challenging intonations in the talk with America – the tone they would like (for whatever reason) to hear from the lips of Russian leaders.
Chavez seems to attract more sympathies in a broad range of Russia's political spectrum than any Russian politician. His cry "Venceremos el imperialismo!" arouses sighs of admiration far and wide: "That is the kind of leader we need! Look how courageous he is, and how daring is his challenge to the nasty Bush!"
He really deserves respect and maybe even delight. Still, that does not yet mean that the ideal of this politician is the best option for Russia.
Chavez's popularity among both Russian leftists and traditionalists is quite natural. The nationalist tradition of Latin America's states is typically leftist, populistic and revolutionary. On the contrary, most of the continent's rightists dictators have been anti-traditional and anti- nationalistic. For a Russian patriot of conservative orientation, Chavez, Castro and the late Salvador Allende are naturally dearer and clearer than Batista, Somoza and Pinochet with their servile submissiveness to Washington's political bosses and corporate tycoons.
So, we are witnessing a small Venezuela teaching a huge Russia how to pursue a truly independent policy. Isn't this a kind of aberration? In 1960s, the USSR served as the vanguard of international effort for liberation of the Third World from colonial oppression and corporate dictate. Today, the same banner is raised by Venezuela and Iran. Should Russia follow?
Chavez is urging Russia and China to join the international camp of fighters against Uncle Sam. "Either we squelch imperialism, or it will squelch the mankind", says Chavez, proposing to resolve this dilemma once and forever.
In fact, Russia has received a serious political signal which has to be conceptualized. Are Russians interested in an anti-imperialistic warfare in the format, proposed by the Venezuelan leader? The response to this challenge requires a focus on Russia's interests, prior to the interests of Chavez himself.
FLUX AND REFLUX OF SOCIALISM
For a responsible judgment, we should look back at the recent history of Latin America. Chavez's nationalization of oil industry is not the first attempt in the history of his nation. As far back as in 1975, the government, dominated by the Democratic Action Party, decided to nationalize both oil-extracting and metal-producing industries. Several years later, the Venezuelans elected another president, Luis Herrera Campins from the Social-Christian Party. Under his rule, the national economy began to decline, despite stable high incomes from oil exports. In 1995, Venezuela's National Congress was forced to pass a law allowing foreigners and global corporations to participate in oil industry. Who can be sure that Chavez's attempt will appear more successful?
It is noteworthy that Chavez's early policy, after his victory on the wave of massive social unrest in 1998 (after he undertook two attempts of a military coup d'etat and spent a term in jail, which made him the fame of a folk hero), was not so resolute. His political line radicalized on the background of fight against the rightist opposition. This contest required new slogans to attract broad sympathies. Using the legal norms of the new constitution (introduced by Chavez himself in 1999 as an alternative to the 1961 constitution, to which he refused to swear an oath), the opposition twice initiated a referendum on confidence to the President. He won those battles under the banner of national liberation, accusing the rightists of a deal with Washington, and expanding nationalization – also in order to undermine the financial base of his opponents.
Chavez's new way to socialism is still something more than just a series of populist public actions for a transitory result. He is really trying to introduce a long-term change, unifying all the major public forces and crushing upon economic parasites and compradors. The norms of the new constitution, which would seem anarchic to a Russian, ostensibly allow the opposition to challenge him, but indirectly help Chavez to attain more popularity, and initiate more resolute measures of social transformation.
However, this design of leadership requires one indispensable element – Chavez himself, with his personal charisma, passion and eloquence. There is no guarantee that his possible successor would possess equal personal qualities, views and human energy.
The three-century political history of Latin America indicates a cyclic replacement of leftist revolutionaries by rightist dictators. Chavez seems to be strongly committed to find a way out of this vicious circle on the basis of a new, higher level of socialist transformation. Will he succeed, or his efforts will turn a revenge?
In fact, rightist coup d'etats in Latin America used to originate not only from external interference but also from disappointment of broad masses with economic difficulties, inherent in transition to socialism.
Chavez's power is as shaky as the power of any Ibero-American leader. The only example of a stabile regime in the whole region is the post-revolutionary Cuba, which Chavez naturally uses as an example.
Implementation of socialism, with no concessions to private capitalist interests, is perceived by him as the only reliable guarantee from a rightist revenge and the relevant return of US corporate interests. He builds up a broader base of support through agreements with other leftist leaders of the continent, such as Bolivia's Evo Moralez, Argentina's Nestor Kirchner, and Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega, whose collective influence would better protect him from the inevitable rightist counter-offensive.
LESSONS OF NATIONAL PRAGMATISM
Chavez must be realizing quite well that today's Russia is much different from the USSR; that it is very distant from an ideologized socialist state; that at present, Russia is rather trying to pursue an ideology of economic pragmatism. Therefore, he cannot expect Russia to assume the role of the locomotive of South America's liberation. Nevertheless, he is making generous compliments, and attracting interests of Russian capitalists – the bourgeoisie of a far greater caliber (in personal fortunes as well) than Venezuela’s business community. Therefore, his approach is actually more tactical than ideological.
The role of a driving force for Ibero-American revolutionary processes, proffered to Russia by Chavez, is certainly attractive – at least given the prospect of acquiring a larger stronghold on the American continent than the USSR ever had. Still, this prospect suggests involvement in policies requiring efforts and expenses which could be otherwise used for the crucial tasks of Russia's domestic development – unless the idée fixe of "crushing imperialism" is unequivocally shared by Moscow.
Ardent sympathizers of Chavez (as well as Ahmadinejad) in Russia, consciously or not, perceive themselves as representatives of a permanently oppressed third-world nation, for which the only possible way of self-affirmation on the global arena is to challenge a wealthy and militarily strong superpower. This perception, and generally this kind of psychology, does not correspond with the view of Russia as a self-sufficient nation and culture – the historically typical view of Russian patriots. The fact that the present Russia has some common grievances with the nations of the Third World, is not yet a sufficient reason for sharing the mood and behavior of these nations. Before digressing into precarious messianic endeavors, Russia should rather concentrate on re-establishing its internal strength.
Even the development of Venezuela's resources should be undertaken by Russian corporations with certain caution. Today, Venezuela is inviting them to invest, obviously being unable to accomplish this task alone. One more idea implied with this invitation, definitely, is to use Russian interests as an additional guarantee for Chavez’s regime – which in case of a head-on collision between Moscow and Washington could be even more convenient. Is participation of Russian business in Venezuelan project going to be followed with certain political conditions of Russia's loyalty? If that is true, this would make Russia a stronghold of Venezuela, and not vice versa.
At the same time, the analysis of Venezuela's behavior – as well as that of its Ibero-American partner countries, Iran, and the Arabic nations of OPEC – is undoubtedly useful a good example of pursuing national interests. This lesson seems to be more instructive than the anti-American rhetoric and Bush-butting as such.
Russia, as well as its partners in Eurasia who are similarly seeking a higher level of political and economic independence from Washington, definitely has its own reasons for "Bush-butting". However, this is not an end in for itself for Russia and allied nations. Healthy national egoism and utilization of friendly attitudes for accomplishing domestic tasks is a policy which Chavez is skillfully pursuing, and which Moscow could certainly apply as well.
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