January 10, 2007 (the date of publication in Russian)
Alexander Sobko
BRUSSELS' BARGAIN WITH ANKARA
The EU hesitates over Turkey
On January 9, Tuesday, the European Commission's Chairman Jose Manuel Barroso approved recommencement of negotiations with Turkey on its entry in the EU as a full-fledged member. Barroso's statement put an end to a pause on the issue, which lasted over a month since the last round of talks over Turkey's EU membership. At that time, the negotiations brought a zero result. In the best case, Turkey's entry is possible at least in 10-15 years. What is the major obstacle for the negotiating sides?
The outline of events dates back to 1963 when Turkey signed a treaty with the European Economic Community. Though this document recognized Turkey's right for entry, Turkey officially became a candidate member only in 1999, while the talks are lasting a bit over a year. The sticking point is Turkey's reluctance to recognize the Republic of Cyprus and the genocide of Armenians. The latter issue is especially important for France, which even recently raised a draft law on criminal prosecution of individuals denying the fact of genocide.
The EU also demands democratic reforms from Turkey, despite remarks from some analysts that relevant measures may play a bad trick with the EU afterwards, as in most cases, democratization of Islamic countries has resulted in an upsurge of radical fundamentalist forces.
In late November, the European Commission proposed to suspend the negotiations on Turkey's entry due to Ankara's reluctance to open the marine and air terminals for the Republic of Cyprus. In early December, this conditionality was supported by France's Jacques Chirac and Germany's Angela Merkel. Mrs. Merkel, a Christian Democrat, was less optimistic over Turkey's entry in the EU than her predecessor Gerhard Schroeder. A month later, Brussels eventually stepped back.
Still, the last remarks of EC's Chairman remind of an invitation to a peace deal after a failed blackmail. This impression corresponds with recent media forecasts of EU's plans to lift its embargo from Northern Cyprus in January. Turkey insisted on that already in early December, proposing to temporarily open two of its sea ports and one airport for Cyprus in case the EU lifts the blockade of the Erkan airport in Northern Cyprus.
EU's policy towards Turkey changes in a manner of a pendulum. In the issue of Turkey's invitation to the EU, Brussels is hesitating over a multitude of pros and contras.
The major "pro" argument is clear: Turkey's entry in the EU reduces its affinity to the Islamic world; in its turn, Europe acquires a lever of influence in the Middle East. For the same reason (among others), the United States are also interested in Turkey's shift to the West. Though Turkey has been a NATO member for years, its entry in the EU would add more influence for the US both in the Mideast and in the EU itself.
Not accidentally, Tony Blair, the most pro-American European leader, urged to resume the negotiations shortly after Brussels' decision to suspend the process. "It would be a grand strategic fallacy for Europe to turn its back to Turkey", Mr. Blair said. He was echoed by Daniel Fried, US Undersecretary of State, who expressed belief in his mid-December presentation, that Turkey is likely to meet the EU criteria, and stressed that the US has always shared Turkey's intention to enter the EU.
What is positive from the viewpoint of Mr. Blair, who hopes to enhance the "group of support" for Anglo-American initiatives in the EU, rather looks negative for the major continental powers of "Old Europe", primarily France and Germany, who obviously fear of the risk of getting isolated in the European home they had themselves built.
One more pretext for Europe's anxiety, not frequently admitted on the official level but nonetheless important, is migration of the rapidly proliferating Turkish population to the EU territory.
Despite the ostensibly valid argument of EU's own interest in labor force, regarding senescence of the Europeans, the native population of Western Europe is unlikely to greet a rapid inflow of immigrants with a too different civilizational identity.
Meanwhile, the Turkish government, though verbally declaring its commitment for entry in the EU, demonstrates reluctance for any significant concessions in issues it regards as principal. On this background, the interest towards membership in the EU is rapidly reducing in the Turkish population. According to recent polls, highlighted in Milliyet daily, the percentage of Eurooptimists has reduced in Turkey from 57 to 32 between 2005 and late 2006.
Add the opinion of 25% Turks that their country should not join the EU under any conditions; consider that 78% of the same respondents "lack confidence" towards the EU. Curiously, the last figure coincides with the percentage of Turks who lack confidence towards the United States.
It is noteworthy that the poll was conducted before the debates over the above mentioned draft law on criminal prosecution for denial of the genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1915.
This legislative initiative even more undermined the confidence of the Turkish population towards France and the EU as a whole. Right after the draft law was passed, Gen. Ilker Basbug, Commander of Turkey's Land Forces, declared that his country is going to break all the military ties with France – though both countries are NATO members. Other Turkish officials urged for boycott of French goods.
It is indicative that on January 9 – on the very day when Jose Manuel Barroso proposed to resume the talks, and Italy's President, meeting with his Turkish counterpart, emphasized Europe's strategic interest in Turkey's entry, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's Prime Minister, claimed that for his country, the situation in Iraq is far more important than the entry in the EU.
In this way, the Turkish Premier made clear that his country is getting weary of an applicant's posture. That is, in case the EU would like to see Turkey join its ranks, Brussels should undertake some "steps forward", mitigating its conditionalities; if not, Turkey would revise its priorities and concentrate on its own geopolitical ambitions in Asia (particularly, in the framework of the Turkic Commonwealth, recently highlighted by RPMonitor).
Still, Turkey is equally reluctant to cease the talks on its EU membership, rather preferring to bargain with Brussels on new concessions. That does not contradict to the former options, as membership in the EU, given the existing demographic and economic tendencies, will not prevent Turkey from expansion of its influence in the eastern direction.
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