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January 18, 2007 (the date of publication in Russian)

Alexander Rudakov

THE "HUMANITARIAN" INTERVENTION PROJECT

Why the United States is interested in perpetual civil war in Iraq

The US military campaign in Iraq is commonly regarded as a failure. This view is most popular in the US itself. Meanwhile, much of what is taking place today in the occupied country is seen through the prism of propagandist stereotypes, borrowed from the same Washington, and their effect simplifies our judgments on the subject.

Today, we are told that the civil warfare, emerging between the Sunni and Shi'i communities with hundreds of thousands casualties, is a result of the inability of the United States to establish order in the occupied country and create conditions for a transition to peaceful life. President George W. Bush himself admits mistakes of the US forces in Iraq, which have resulted in today's situation.

In case the purpose of the intervention was to assist the Iraqi in construction of a model democratic state, as it was declared by the US state propaganda machine, then the present situation should be really viewed as a strategic failure. However, in case we address the implicit purposes of US strategy, the conclusions may be much different. The carnage, unleashed across the territory of the occupied Iraq, may imply an element of a profoundly cynical but efficient scenario.

In 1991, George H.R. Bush was reluctant to overthrow Saddam, regarding the idea of building a pro-American regime in this country as unrealistic.

Certainly, the temptation of a massive invasion in Iraq, in order to establish control over oil wells and erect a stronghold for immediate pressure upon Iran and Syria was equally high at that time, and General Norman Schwarzkopf, in particular, insisted on such a venture.

However, George H.R. Bush's strategists realized that the vacuum, left after the overthrow of the secular nationalistic Baath party, would be filled by radical religious political groups. In this prospect, an attempt to impose a marionette government and provide military assistance to it would result in a new Vietnam.

It was equally unreasonable to destroy Saddam and pull out on the next day. Iraq's oil-rich areas were Shi'i-dominated, and potentially oriented towards Iran. To unseat Saddam meant to convey the control of Iraqi oil to a more serious adversary, Tehran, as well as to endanger the closest ally, Saudi Arabia, where Ayatollah Khomeini threatened to export his revolution already in 1980s.

In addition, Saddam's doom would – as it was considered at that time – inevitably result in emergence of an independent Kurdistan, with relevant troubles for another key ally, Turkey.

During the following twelve years between 1991 and 2003, the situation in Iraq has not significantly changed.

Within the same period, much has changed in the United States, where a group of ultra-rightist politicians overtook influence on foreign policy making, pursuing a much harsher and much more cynical agenda. Basing upon the mission of "guaranteeing energy security to the United States" (the Lugar doctrine), they preferred a direct military supervision of oil-rich territories across the globe.

Due to a number of reasons, including the aftermath of a military defeat of the Iraqi forces in 1991, a relatively small population, and the obvious fragility of the country's secular leadership, Iraq was selected for an approbation of this strategy.

From the military policy viewpoint, efficient occupational control over Iraq was a far more complicated task than the initial phase of intervention and the overthrow of Saddam.

For an efficient occupational management, the United States needed to prevent consolidation of the resistance, which could elevate new popular political leaders with ambitions for political power. From Washington's standpoint, a new Viet Cong and a new Ho Shi Minh in Iraq would be least desirable. Exactly for that reason, the occupying administration started to fuel up a split between the Sunni and the Shi'i from the very beginning.

This effort represents an old-time colonial tactics, efficiently used in India and African countries by the British. Though not so explicitly, the United States are doing exactly the same. The US side is relying upon its long-time ally, Saudi Arabia, which in many regards is a more reliable partner than, for instance, Israel. Ostensibly, the political behavior looks perfect: the US forces are said to be striving for the nation's integrity and for the truce between the clashing ethnic and religious communities.

Meanwhile, all the "black work" is conducted by the Saudi agency of influence, which permanently redirects the paramilitary activities of the Sunni guerillas from the foreign occupants to the local Shi'is.

From the geopolitical viewpoint, the result is quite impressive. According to various estimates, the ratio of casualties among the natives and the occupants ranges between 50:1 and 100:1. At the same time, the US side has gained better control over the Sunni groups, reportedly striking an agreement of non-assault in exchange for non-interference in their atrocities against the Shi'i.

The latest events, especially the execution of Saddam Hussein and his ministers, exactly correspond with this line. The video record of the cadres where the hangmen of Saddam are tightening the loop around his neck, chanting the name of Muktada al Sadr, the idol of the Shi'i resistance, are serving to the objective of igniting stronger hate among the two major religious communities. Saudi media contribute to this effort, immediately spreading the rumor that Saddam was executed personally (sic) by Muktada al Sadr and Abed Aziz al Hakim, a moderate leader regarded as the most influential person in the Shi'i community.

The scandal around another execution, in which Hussein's stepbrother Barzan al Tikriti was not just hanged but afterwards beheaded, adds more preconditions for a stronger ethnic clash.

Thus, the purpose of prevention of any unification of the two major Iraqi religious communities is successfully implemented. This achievement is crucial for other tasks of the United States in Iraq. Practically, a civil war between the Sunni and the Shi'i is a convenient pretext for keeping the US presence in Iraq as long as possible.

In 2003, the United States justified its intervention in Iraq with a danger of weapons of mass destruction, which Saddam was allegedly going to use against other countries. A year later, Washington admitted the absence of WMD, and the agenda changed: the US military presence was now interpreted with the desire to assist the Iraqi in "liberation from tyranny" and "buildup of democracy".

Today, the propagandist cover story acquires a third interpretation after the original "search of WMD" and "assistance in democracy". Namely, the necessity to "separate the sides of the regional conflict" and to prevent an ostensibly spontaneous "further deterioration", which "could result in more casualties among the peaceful population".

Even most convinced pacifists would not easily dare to reject such arguments, as from now on, the United States is now conducting a military mission not for the sake of oil and even not for anti-terrorist reasons. This new agenda is likely to be shared not only by neoconservative Republicans but also by top Democrats who tend to require a more subtle and astute justification of Pentagon's policy.

Therefore, we have enough grounds to expect that the next phase of the US occupation of Iraq will acquire the style of a "humanitarian intervention" on a Bosnia or Kosovo pattern. In such a framework, all the geopolitical tasks, unsolved in 1991, are likely to be fulfilled, including prevention of Kurdish independence, transition of Shi'i territories under Iran's control, etc.

Saudi Arabia, as the major partner, may even receive an additional bonus of control over a part of the Sunni-populated territory of Iraq. On January 17, Riyadh expressed commitment to deploy its military forces in the Anbar province.

It is also quite possible that in the nearest future, the United States will even introduce a special analogue of the Hague Tribunal for individuals from both sides, "responsible for atrocities". One does not need a gift of prophecy to guess that the major convicts will be picked from the presently popular anti-American public figures.

In addition, the regime of Iran will be blamed for bloody clashes in the neighbor country, thus justifying punitive bomb attacks.

The recent arrest of Iranian diplomats in Erbil, undertaken by US intelligence, is quite symptomatic in this regard.

Summarizing this interpretation, we may admit that the civil war between the Sunni and the Shi'i was not something unexpected for Washington, being rather an element of the US scenario. This civil war efficiently undermines any serious strategic resistance to the US occupation across the Middle East, and the United States is not facing a risk of "a second Vietnam in Iraq". In its turn, the US acquires additional pretexts for continuing the occupation – which may now last for decades.

The assumption of a US failure in the war in Iraq is erroneous. Actually, America succeeds, though being reluctant to confess of this before the rest of the world, in order to avoid charges of cynical, bloodthirsty and fraudulent policies.


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