March 14, 2007 (the date of publication in Russian)
Yaroslav Butakov
BETWEEN BUSH AND BUSHEHR
The US-Iran confrontation puts Russia to a disadvantage
Russian mass media have lately provided detailed comments on the debate, emerging between Moscow and Tehran after Iran's decision to postpone investments in the construction of Bushehr Nuclear Plant. On March 9, Andrey Krivtsov, deputy director of Russian Foreign Ministry's Department of Information and press, the Moscow talks between Russia's Atomstroyexport (Nuclear Construction & Exporting Co.) and Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) were stalled. It was announced that Russia is unlikely to complete the delivery of the first portion of nuclear fuel to Iran (originally scheduled for March), and therefore, the long-expected launching of the first reactor in September will be impossible. In his comments on the outcome of the negotiations, IAEO's deputy chairman Mohammad Sayidi indicated that the problem is exceeding the merely technological aspect of the project's implementation.
As Mr. Sayidi insists, Iran has been transferring payments for Russia's technological assistance quite regularly. Obviously, as he says, Atomstroyexport is faced with its own financial problems, which the company intends to solve for expense of Iran's advanced tranches. Under these conditions, Iran is ready to pay in advance, but requires guarantees of Russia's timely fulfillmentof its obligations on delivery of nuclear materials and the reactor's construction.
A new curve of events around Iran's nuclear program unfolded after the February 21 expiry of the period, granted to Iran by the UN Security Council for the abandonmentof the uranium enrichment program. Soon thereafter, Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, addressing a public rally in Tehran, declared that "nobody is able to coerce Iran to give up its nuclear program, which is exceptionally peaceful". This statement sounded as a response to UN's demands.
Russia's reaction was rather prompt. In late February – early March, Mikhail Margelov, chair of the Federation Council's Foreign Relations Committee, paid a visit to the United States and later to Iran. After his trip, the Senator made a number of statements, reflecting a new, harsher position of Moscow. From his talks with top US officials, Mr. Margelov derived a conclusion that Washington's military operation against Iran is very probable. Elaborating on his Tehran round of talks, the Russian Senator admitted in public that Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons under the guise of a civil program of atomic energy development. Such a statement from a top Russian official was heard for the first time.
Therefore, the debate under the pretext of underfinancing is not surprising at all. Already a week before, the issue of technological assistance in Bushehr project was elevated by Moscow to a political level. On March 13, the same Mikhail Margelov urged the Iranian side to resume payments for Russian assistance, motivating his words as follows: "Years ago, the Soviet Union was literally exhausted by partners from newly independent post-colonial countries which interpreted friendly relations exceptionally as Moscow's charity, and the Soviet leadership actually paid them from the pockets of its own ordinary citizens". He added that until now, Russia, as the USSR's legal successor, has to write off lots of irrecoverable debts.
The parallel of Iran with former colonies is actually incorrect, as Iran, as well as Russia, has never been anyone's colony. Neither it was a backward country; neither it had unredeemed obligations to Moscow. All this reminds a method, typical for a part of Russia's establishment, when doubtful mercantile arguments are used for justification of ambiguous political decisions.
It is noteworthy that yet on February 28, Avigdor Liberman, Israel's Minister of Strategic Planning, expressed belief in his interview to Kommersant daily that Russia would back harsh economic sanctions against Iran. "Russia and Israel are on the one side of the barricade", he said with confidence. Mr. Lieberman claimed that the change of Russia's position was already obvious in February from Moscow's reluctance to starting deliveries of nuclear fuel to Iran at the scheduled time.
As Kommersant's author believes, Moscow's demarche is designed for a maximum mitigation of the inevitable harsh UN resolution vis-à-vis Iran: "For its job of saving Iran from sanctions, suggesting a risk of a complete deterioration of its relations with the US, Russia has not received any compensation from Tehran. Under these circumstances, Moscow, preferring to caution Iran already openly, without traditional diplomatic gestures, intends to preclude not only the sanctions against Tehran. Russian politicians realize that in case Iran does not agree for reasonable concessions, George W. Bush's administration may undertake a military attack on Iran. This option is even less acceptable for Moscow than an anti-Washington game on Iran's rules".
In early March, media agencies mentioned that a certain "Moscow-based informed source" rather harshly and unequivocally expressed his assessment of Iran's policy. "Unfortunately, the Iranians have been misusing our constructive approach, doing nothing to help us to convince our colleagues of the consistency of Tehran's policy moves". "We are faced with disadvantage for our foreign policy, and for our reputation. They are pushing their line. Iran with a nuclear bomb or a potential of its acquisition is unacceptable for us", – the source claimed, adding Moscow "is not going to play any anti-American games". These words were widely broadcasted by Russian media on March 13-14. Still, a number of respectable media, like Interfax, withdrew this report from open access hours later.
Let us try to get to bottom of the situation. It is quite obvious that the problem of underfinancing is not more than a pretext for a change of Moscow’s political position. In case Iran- as it is now admitted also by the Russian side – is really engaged in mastering nuclear weapons (which is unacceptable for us), what does the Bushehr contract have to do with that? Conditioning one issue with another, Russia may represent itself in an unfavorable light.
As a matter of fact, in case Russia's sabotage of nuclear fuel deliveries, discomfiting the plan of the Bushehr reactor's launching, is destined to prevent implementation of an Iranian nuclear program of military character, it would be logical to suppose that contrary to earlier statements of both Russia and Iran, Moscow's nuclear energy assistance to Tehran can be potentially used by Iran not only in civil purposes. Does that mean that Russia openly admits this today?
In case, on the contrary, the object in Bushehr can't be used for military purposes, in which way can Russia’s reluctance to assist in it prevent Iran from constructing a nuclear bomb? Meanwhile, not only Russia is interested in development of Iran's energy potential. Another country, China, is also eager to cooperate with Tehran; it is noteworthy that the character and scale of the Beijing-Tehran partnership is far less transparent for the West than the Moscow-Tehran cooperation. Russia's withdrawal from Iran's nuclear market would have only one consequence: this niche would be – entirely – occupied by China. Is that the implicit purpose of the informed anonyms?
Finally, there is one more option. It is possible that a military strike upon Iran is really viewed by Washington as the only scenario. Under such conditions, it really does not make sense to bestow investments for an industrial object doomed to impending elimination. Still, it is obvious that in case even a very small opportunity to prevent the large-scale war is available, it would be impossible to use it by means of the above-described policy. Russia's repudiation of the Bushehr project is likely to be interpreted by the United States just as an additional incentive for resolving the Iranian crisis by force.
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