November 22, 2007 (the date of publication in Russian)

Yaroslav Butakov

THE KOSOVO PRECEDENT: CHALLENGES AND RISKS

The United States seeks to drag Russia into a perilous game

A LOOMING REPARTITION OF THE BALKANS

Hashim Thaci, a former warlord, once sentenced to 7 years of custody and wanted by Interpol, today chairs the Democratic Party of Kosovo. After the elections in which his party won, he declared that in case international mediators fail to arrive at an accord on the future status of Kosovo, independence of this territory will be proclaimed unilaterally.

A new round of talks between Belgrade and Pristina, involving mediators from the US, the EU and Russia, ended with a zero result. The Kosovo leaders are not going to accept any of the proposed versions except full-fledged state independence. They even rejected the proposal of Washington and Brussels to sign a temporary agreement on a neutral status of Kosovo. Serbia's proposal of a "Hong Kong model" for Kosovo, suggesting a comprehensive autonomy (with its own legislation and security) of the republic within the Serbian state, is rejected even more vehemently.

The prospect of unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence is becoming more and more plausible. Experts are trying to assess the implications. Almost all of them admit that independence, acquired in this way, is likely to be immediately recognized by the United States. Most probably, Washington is pursuing this very option.

In this way, the United States are going to impose a desired split on the European Union, part of which perceives Kosovo's independence with caution. Spain, Romania, Greece and Cyprus share fears of increase of the separatist ferment in their nations in case of Kosovo's recognition as an independent state. Each of these countries has got regions with a strong secessionist potential (resp. Catalonia, Galicia (Galiza), and the Land of Basques; Transylvania; Chameria (Chamuria), and the presently unrecognized Northern Cyprus).

 

A BET ON CHAOS

Many observers share the view that declaration of Kosovo's independence is also likely to result in a new curve of tensions across the Balkans, possibly resulting in a new Balkan war. The incumbent government of Kosovo is formed without any participation of Serbs who neglected the elections, having no illusions over possibility to influence decision-making. International bodies, supposed to protect rights of minorities, have failed to fulfill their tasks. Declaration of independence by the illegitimate and essentially ethnocratic authorities may become a signal for the Serbian minority, compactly inhabiting the north of the autonomy, for an insurrection against the regime of Pristina. At the same time, Serbian sources have lately reported about clandestine preparations of Albanian warlords for an attack on the Serb-dominated enclave of Kosovska Mitrovica, suggesting a new wave of ethnic cleansing.

This highly probable clash may trigger a new repartition of the Balkans, involving the Albanian minority of Greece, Macedonia and Montenegro, under the slogans of Great Albania. Bosnia may be again shaken with a religious conflict of Croats and Moslems. The echo of a new struggle for ethnic self-identification may wake the Rumelian Turks in Bulgaria's south and Greece's north-east. The lamebrain international management, actually patronizing one people against another, may trigger chaos across the whole of former Yugoslavia.

This kind of scenario is undesirable for the European Union, as it generates additional problems in the zone of EU's "civilizational responsibility", postponing integration of Balkan states in the EU structures for an indefinite period, and discrediting EU efforts of conciliation in the Balkans. For the same reasons, this outcome is favorable for the United States. It allows Washington not only to expand military presence in the area but also to weaken the EU as its global economic rival.

Certainly, the United States will act under the auspices of NATO. However, we see that European nations are increasingly reluctant to share the burden of peacekeeping with the US partners. They will either have to yield the crucial role in Balkan reconciliation to the United States (with a prospect of a zone of permanent influence), or to undertake an undesirable increase of military expenses and related curtailment of social programs.

 

THE SMALLER DETRIMENT

The debate on Kosovo's future independence repeatedly raises the issue of post-Soviet unrecognized states. This issue was in the focus of the November 20 TV link-up between Moscow and Baku, involving Vadim Gustov, Chair of Federation Council's NIS Committee. The Senator claimed that the problem of Kosovo is essentially similar to the issues of Transdniester, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh. The same argument was earlier raised by Vladimir Putin, to be vehemently rejected by a number of European politicians who tried to describe Kosovo as a "unique case".

Nevertheless, the approval of Kosovo independence draws a serious challenge today not only for many European states with a secessionist sentiment in their own provinces but for Russia as well. As a matter of fact, Russia has missed the most favorable period for support of independence of post-Soviet unrecognized states with subsequent integration into its borders, though such a prospect was approved, for instance, by the population of South Ossetia at a public referendum, and though the majority of this unrecognized republic's population had meanwhile acquired Russian citizenship.

In the period between parliamentary and presidential elections, Russia is obviously not ready to deal with the problem of post-Soviet breakaway autonomies. That is why the declaration of Kosovo independence is quite untimely for Moscow. This fact is obviously well understood by US strategists.

In the situation of today, there is no guarantee that the official recognition of Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's independence by Russia would result with consolidation of this independence on the basis of international law, not speaking of international approval of integration of these breakaway territories into Russia. In this open-ended game, Washington is clearly wagering on Russia's defeat. Essentially, the United States overtook initiative already in 2004, launching the so-called "revolution of roses" in Georgia.

"The 'revolution of roses' has become a starting point for new US expansionism. Now, not a single foreign policy issue in Tbilisi is solved without approval from the US State Department", emphasizes Levan Dzhashi, former director of Tbilisi-based Institute of Democracy and National Values. "The West has thus gained a possibility not only to impede any attempt of Georgia to reach an agreement with Russia, but also to discredit the very idea of Georgia's neutrality which actually provides the only option for a consensus – and thus to annihilate the prospect of a peaceful solution favorable for both Russia and Georgia.

"Russia has actually become a hostage of the development around Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the background of the Kosovo debate. In case Russia officially recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia will find itself completely at the disposal of the West, and the dynamic of a new war in the Caucasus will be controlled by Washington. In case this war forces Russia to give up its interests, Moscow will lose the present buffer zones of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, leaving a convenient stronghold for the West at its borders, and thus enabling its 'friends and partners' to stir waters of the Black Sea, invigorating secessionism in Russia itself", writes Levan Dzhashi.

The above quoted arguments of Senator Vadim Gustov were echoed with a predictable response from secessionist thinkers in Russia. Ravil Valeyev, MP of Tatarstan's Parliament, views the option of recognition of unrecognized republics as a convenient pretext for his own republic's secession: "We are not stupid people. If Abkhazians, Ossetians, and Karabakh Armenians of Karabakh are allowed independence, why the same is not available for Tatars?"

The leadership of Russia has to envisage all the implications of international recognition of Kosovo's sovereignty, which is today highly probable. The dilemma, faced by Russia in the problem of unrecognized states is not an issue of a higher advantage – by active intervention or passive non-involvement – but rather an issue of a smaller detriment.

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