January 11, 2008 (the date of publication in Russian)
Grigory Tinsky
THE POLISH KEY FOR US MISSILES
Warsaw to make decision on ABM deployment after US elections
The concerns of the United States about the decision of the new Government of Poland to withdraw the national contingent from Iraq, as well as the reluctance of Prime Minister Donald Tusk to wholeheartedly encourage deployment of US ABM facilities on the territory of Poland, are expressed mostly on an unofficial level. New Polish leaders display high diplomatic skills, establishing a new, more pragmatic balance of relations with the United States, the European Union and Russia.
Poland‘s top officials have lately expressed their commitment to consider Russian interests in sensitive issues of global policy.
Slavomir Novak, head of Donald Tusk's political office, emphasizes that Poland is going to "behave very cautiously" on the issue of Kosovo independence, as "Poland's relations with Russia are of a higher priority". Admitting that the Kosovo issue is very complicated, and that the EU should discuss all the possible implications, Mr. Novak indicates that his country intends to "avoid pretexts for conflicts with Russia", which stands for Serbia's integrity.
In his turn, ex-Defense Minister Bronislaw Komorowski declared on Christmas Eve that Poland was not going to dispatch a delegation of observers to Tbilisi during the Presidential elections, interpreting this decision with considerations of austerity. This decision aroused harsh criticism from today's oppositionist (formerly ruling) PIS party of brothers Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski. Karol Karski, a prominent figure from PIS who is going to monitor the elections as an observer from the Council of Europe, accused Mr. Komorowski of "curtseying to Russia". "This decision is especially unpleasant as Georgians are in need of Polish support. Austerity is a slim excuse, as the Sejm does not spend half of money allocated for duty journeys", he said.
This is a rare occasion in which Karski's words seem to sound truthful: Komorowski's gesture was one of the signals supposed to convince Russia of a serious intention of the new Polish government to introduce a qualitative change in the relationship between Warsaw and Moscow.
BALANCING BENEFITS AND RISKS
Still, the new, balanced policy of Poland suggests also an array of diplomatic gestures addressed to Washington. The role of a liaison is played by Foreign Minister Radislaw Sikorski with his background of connections with US politicians.
Speaking to the US establishment, Mr. Sikorski simultaneously tries to sooth the counterpart and hints at a desirable compensation for a possible deployment of US ABM facilities in Poland:
"We have agreed with Moscow that Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Kislyak, visit Warsaw and present the arguments of the Russian side, as well as the technical details, and express Russia's view on this very sensitive issue. In this discussion, we are going to elaborate our own view on the adequacy of sharing risks related to the deployment of the US ABM systems in Poland. Certainly, discussion with the nearest neighbors is a matter of courtesy.
We are going to arrive at our decision independently".
In his comments for Gazeta Wyborcza on Kislyak's visit, Radislav Sikorski confirmed that he is going to listen to Russian arguments, "with regard for the example of the United States which discuss the ABM issue with Russia much longer and much more intensively". He explained that even in case the concerns of the neighbor are quite groundless, they should be listened, as "we can't choose our neighbors: we are to coexist with them, as the neighbor is near, and the ally is distant".
Asked whether the whole ABM thing is really necessary, Sikorski pointed out that "this is not a Polish but an American project". Remarkably assuming that Poland "does not feel any menace originating from Iran", he said that in case the important ally addressed Poland with a request on this issue, it should be taken seriously". Actually, given a much larger distance between Washington and Tehran than between Tehran and Moscow, this remark sounds pretty ironic.
In his next statement, Sikorski clearly admits that the deployment of US ABM systems in Poland is not going to improve Warsaw's political relations with other EU states. The US side, as well as the US-Polish relations, is going to benefit, he says, omitting a relevant conjunction "on the contrary". Referring to experts, Sikorski emphasizes that in case the United States decided to build an ABM system for the same purpose on its own territory, it would have to be multiple.
"At the same time, we are facing certain elements of risk", he adds. "We'd like the benefits and risks to be shared more equally and justly. It would be inappropriate if all the NATO members benefit while a single member takes all the risks upon himself".
Avoiding an answer to the direct question whether the mentioned risks were related to a possibility of a Russian counterstrike, Sikorski firmly states that deterioration of Polish-Russian relations would be a too high price "in the situation when we are trying to normalize them".
Sikorski is uncertain on the prospects of the ABM issue within the current year: "This depends not only on Poland but also on the United States. The essence of American proposals should be enough convincing to be presented at the Sejm".
This, the Foreign Minister points out that the ABM issue could be resolved only in a framework of an agreement, necessarily ratified by the Parliament. At the same time, he reminds of the uncertainty of American political prospects:
"We shouldn't forget about the elections in the United States. We’ll face the worst option for us if we make a positive decision on ABM deployment, which eventually appears needless with a new US leadership".
When asked to explain why George W.Bush skipped Poland, thanking a number of states for assistance in Afghanistan on the Christmas Eve, Sikorski noted that even superpowers make lapses, recalling an occasion when Bush confused Slovenia and Slovakia, and as a result, Slovenia was granted financial assistance earmarked for Slovakia.
"So, just never mind what Bush didn't say", Sikorski concluded.
BRZEZINSKI DOUBTS ABM AS WELL
Generally, Poland's foreign policy has become fairly predictable: trying to find out Poland's view on a certain subject, ask Zbigniew Brzezinski what he thinks of it. For Donald Tusk, this figure is as important as the classics of Marxism had been for Wladislaw Gomulka.
Meanwhile, Mr. Brzezinski expresses his view on ABM deployment quite clearly: "One can't make decisions on a non-existing anti-missile shield from non-existing threats built for non-existing money".
Curiously, Poland's inaction on the issue of ABM deployment made the country's political stand much stronger than it was under the predictable rule of Jaroslaw Kaczynski. As soon as the new Government promised to envisage the issue more seriously and comprehensively rather than hurrying to fulfill all of Washington's whims, Poland attracted much more interest from all the involved sides. While Washington just increased political pressure on Poland, Russia lifted the meat embargo, probably timing more positive surprises for Donald Tusk's arrival in Moscow.
WHAT CAN MOSCOW PROPOSE TO WARSAW?
Moscow possesses a multitude of tools for "repairing" its relations with Warsaw. The most significant of them are certainly related to the North Stream pipeline. The present agreement on the gas route from Russia to Western Europe leaves Poland neglected. Tusk's government ostensibly shares the view of its predecessors that the pipeline should be built rather along the land, across the Polish territory. It is noteworthy that Gazprom originally preferred to line an additional string of the existing Yamal – Western Europe gas pipeline across the Polish territory, but Poland then disagreed. Today, calculating the missed profit, Warsaw agrees to join a more expensive project that was actually chosen due to Poland’s own obstinacy in the period between 1997 and 2001.
Warsaw hopes today to convince Russia and Germany, the major stakeholders of North Stream, to return to the earlier and cheaper option of the second string of the Yamal pipeline. Meanwhile, Germany politely proposes to build a branch of North Stream from Greifswald to Poland – but this option is undoubtedly more costly.
The Polish Government has some other, less mercantile ambitions which are up to Moscow's choice. Poland would like to play a more significant role in EU's Eastern policy. While Jaroslaw Kaczynski identified himself as an ardent Euroatlanticist, Donald Tusk definitely clings to Europe.
The increasing rivalry between France and Germany, surfacing in the debate over the Mediterranean Union – the flagship concept of Nicolas Sarkozy – has thrown Warsaw into a dilemma: to support Germany, its closest Western neighbor and rival in EU's Eastern policy, or France, whose different approach to European security is likely to create new problems? The only trump which Poland played before was its "special relationship" with Washington. This presently unworkable trump could be adequately replaced with another one – namely, Poland's "special" role in the Eastern policy of the European Union, accruing from a "special relationship" with Moscow.
POLAND'S POSSIBLE RESPONSE
Is Moscow ready for a "special relationship" with Poland in case the choice is worth ten US anti-ballistic missiles, stuck in the Polish soil in the vicinity of Slupsk?
In case Poland eventually rejects the deployment of US missiles, this choice will be interpreted as a victory of Russian diplomacy and a defeat of Washington's strategy. Moscow's international prestige would grow in an inverse proportion to Washington's, as – regardless from the official explanations – ABM deployment in Poland is widely perceived in the context of a US-Russian debate.
Most probably, Poland won't make any definite decision until November 2008. In case the new master of the White House gives up the idea of ABM deployment in Eastern Europe, Warsaw will overdraw its own contribution to this decision. In case Washington's commitment remains unchanged, Tusk's government is likely to chaffer all possible compensations so as to guarantee that benefits and risks be shared "equally and justly".
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