January 21, 2008 (the date of publication in Russian)
Alexander Sobko, Alexander Rublev
SERBIA: THE PRESIDENT TO BE ELECTED BY THE PRIME MINISTER?
The outcome is likely to be determined by the "third force"
The first round of the presidential elections in Serbia, held last Sunday, has created a déjà vu effect, resembling the January 2007 parliamentary elections. Even the date of the vote differed only by one day.
The major contenders for Serbian Presidency were the same two persons whose parties collided in 2007: Tomislav Nikolic, representing the Serbian Radical party, and incumbent President Boris Tadic, endorsed by his Democratic Party. The vote split with a score of 40:36%, thus making the second round inevitable.
Though the rhetoric of the major candidates is strongly patriotic, both of them standing for Serbia's territorial integrity, they have spectacularly diverse orientation: to boost integration in the EU (Tadic), or to develop partnership with Russia (Nikolic).
Earlier, Boris Tadic was ready for certain concessions on independence of Kosovo, Serbia's breakaway autonomy. Now, under the pressure of public opinion, he does not dare to cave in. Regarding this fact, UN Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari preferred to postpone promulgation of his plan of Kosovo's gradual secession. The same considerations forced Brussels to delay the decision on Kosovo until spring.
Similarly to the situation of January 2007, the outcome of the political contest highly depends on the "third force", personified by Vojislav Kostunica and his Democratic Party of Serbia. Despite Tadic's strong requests to support him as the common candidate of the Government coalition, Kostunica endorsed a party colleague of his own, Velimir Ilic, who garnered 7.5%.
Are more coincidences going to follow? Is the tandem of Tadic and Kostunica supposed to split before the second round? The answer depends on a number of factors. The three key figures of Serbian policy are now in the process of unofficial talks.
Vojislav Kostunica is perfectly aware of the fact that in case of Tadic's victory, the opportunities to prevent Kosovo's secession would be equal to zero. Mr. Tadic, intending to transform Serbia into a "normal European state", is unlikely to fulfill his patriotic promises delivered during the campaign. In the parliamentary-presidential system of power in today's Serbia, Kostunica has got ample opportunities. Still, it would be exceptionally hard for him to uphold integrity alone.
Already today, Tadic is indignant at Kostunica's doubts of the necessity to sign the Agreement on Stabilization and Association with the European Union. Tadic insists that in the framework of a closer partnership with Europe, it would be easier for Serbia to assert its position on Kosovo. However, the EU view on this issue is barely political and is unlikely to be reversed in this way.
Tadic is also ready to give away Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic to the Hague tribunal in the same way as Slobodan Milosevic was given away earlier. Under pressure from Brussels, the incumbent President has already promised a 1mln Euro prize for the information which would facilitate the capture of the two generals who are regarded in the Serbian community as heroes. EU officials have reiterated that in case the two generals are not brought to the court (though their whereabouts are unknown), the talks on Serbia's entry into EU would be paralyzed, and the Treaty on Stabilization and Association with the EU would be ruled out.
In the recent spectacular episode with Karadzic's family, the Hague Tribunal demonstrated that in dealing with relatives of "foes of democracy", international law may be ignored.
In early January, the relatives of Radovan Karadzic, residing in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were deprived of passports under the pretext of their assistance in concealment of Karadzic, although these persons had repeatedly sworn that they had not communicated with him for years, and although no evidence was there to prove the opposite.
Kostunica is far from young, and he definitely would not like to go down in history with a disgusting stigma of a traitor. With their centuries-long experience of Ottoman oppression, Serbs are resentful. For instance, waywode Vuk Brankovic, who drew out his troop from the Kosovo Field in order to prevent unavailing perish in the knowingly desperate battle, has since gained an epic reputation of a traitor, though years later, he repeatedly revolted against the Turks and was eventually captured and killed by them. All the later attempts to exculpate Brankovic failed to dispel the myth that emerged around this figure in folk history.
Kostunica may fear that the next generations of Serbs fail to grasp his complicated strategy and eventually label him "the second Brankovic", the person who retreated from the Kosovo Field for the second time. This is a sufficient reason for saying no to Tadic before the second round.
One more difference between the situations of January 2007 and today is related to Serbia's energy cooperation with Russia that has just entered a new phase of development. Gazprom has just addressed Belgrade with a double proposal: the Russian corporation is ready to purchase NIS, Serbia's state-owned oil company, and to involve Serbia into the South Stream gas pipeline project. Kostunica supports the deal, but other ministers of the centrist-liberal coalition disagree. Mladan Dinkic, Minister of Economy, strongly opposes the deal with Gazprom, describing it as a losing bargain.
However, Dinkic is playing cunning, as the purchase of NIS is not the key element of the agreement. Serbia's involvement in the South Stream project would enable the country to secure transit incomes for years ahead. At the same time, the gas, shipped along the South Stream pipleline, is going to be more cheap and reliable that the present transit across Ukraine and Hungary. Today, Serbia receives gas for the highest price in the region, due to transit tariffs imposed by Hungary's MOL, one more contender for NIS.
On the eve of the elections, Tadic avoided the risk of displaying anti-Russian bias, saying that he hasn't got a definite opinion on the agreement with Gazprom. His present ambiguity is likely to turn a firm negation after the elections, and Serbia's entry in South Stream project may be delayed for years. For Serbian energy business, patronized by Kostunica, this outcome may be disastrous. This is one more reason for a split with Tadic.
The third motive is personal. Today, Kostunica is perceived as a "hawk" in the coalition tandem in the Western eyes, while common Serbs view him as a conformist. In an alliance with Nikolic, Kostunoca would gain more opportunities to regain the role of the "father of the nation", and acquire a more advantageous position in the dialogue with the West.
Velimir Ilic's outspoken hate towards Tadic makes the situation even clearer. Having taken a most active part in the overthrow of President Slobodan Milosevic in autumn 2000, Ilic changed his view a year later, admitting his mistake. He viewed the government of Zoran Djindjic that came after Milosevic as a greater evil for Serbia than "iron Slobo". Thus, Ilic's deal with Nikolic before the second round is highly probable. Ilic even does not have to make declarations: it would be sufficient to tell his supporters to make their choice independently.
In case Kostunica and Ilic urge their electorate to support Tadic, the voters may disobey and choose Nikolic. This option would be most unfavorable for Kostunica, as his influence in the Serbian society may be thus fatally undermined.
Number of shows: 1157
ENG 
