January 28, 2008 (the date of publication in Russian)
Yaroslav Butakov
"CALM" OVER IRAN?
Both Washington and Tehran seem to be pretty fed up with hysteria around the "Islamic nuclear bomb"
The UN Security Council is about to pass its third resolution on Iran. Unlike the first two, it does not suppose hardening of international sanctions. Two weeks ago, six international mediators (including five permanent UNSC members plus Germany), at their minister-level meeting in Berlin, agreed that the Islamic Republic should not undergo new proscriptive measures. The draft resolution contains only a recommendation for all the UN member states to adhere to the regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in any contacts with Tehran.
Thus, the new UN resolution represents no more than a bureaucratic formality. The decision of the Group of Six to refrain from additional sanctions may be interpreted as the success of Iran – which actually ignored the two earlier resolutions – in its effort to defend its right for a sovereign program of nuclear development. It also enables Russia to continue its long-time cooperation in the Bushehr Nuclear Plant project.
The new decision of the Group of Six became possible after the United States mitigated its approach to Iran's plans of nuclear development. This change is highly spectacular.
The beginning of year 2007 was marked with promises of harsh sanctions on behalf of UNSC, and with militaristic rhetoric from both Washington and Tehran. At that time, Moscow delayed the first delivery of nuclear fuel for the Bushehr plant. Nevertheless, Iran confirmed its commitment to fulfill its nuclear program, regardless from any international decisions and related sanctions. A new war in the Middle East seemed then highly probable. A number of experts even forecasted the date of possible attack of the United States on Iranian objects, while Ret. Gen. Tom McInerney, ex-deputy commander of the US Air Forces, told the Israeli audience that the intimidating operation might be fulfilled within three days.
However, these forecasts and threats have not come true. Heating up tensions around Iran's nuclear program, the United States uses them for pursuing other political goals. The first, essentially domestic goal is to consolidate the nation at the face of the supposed menace from outside. Since Saddam Hussein's execution and the intimidation of Taliban, Washington has been in need of a new image of infernal evil, challenging freedom and democracy. The second, diplomatic goal is to continue to tell the world who is its unrivalled master. The third, regional goal is to coerce China and Russia to curtail cooperation with Iran.
Beijing and Moscow are viewed by the White House as primary rivals in the Gulf region. In order to regain the advantages enjoyed by US corporations prior to the Islamic revolution of 1979, the rivals should be expulsed from Iran.
For years, the United States has been playing the card of separatism in the multiethnic Iran. In case of success, China and Russia would be inevitably forced to leave, while US interests could strike deals with newly-established regimes of Kurdistan, Baluchistan, and Southern Azerbaijan. However, this scenario became unlikely under the rule of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Moreover, a risky game could presently detonate a 9/11-kind of reaction, with dire prospects for extracting economic profits.
After all, the whole fuss around Iranian nuclear threat was arranged in order to achieve a pretext for permanent pressure on Tehran, supposed to coerce Iran to mitigate its political stand vis-à-vis the "Great Shaitan" (i.e. the United States). Washington does not display any concern of the nuclear program of Egypt, regarding this country as a reliable vassal. Regional vassals could be also entrusted to control Iran's nuclear industry if Tehran allowed – but after the overthrow of the Shah, the pathway into the land of Omar Khayyam was blocked for Yankees. Forever – or for a period of time?
During the tenure of President Mohammad Khattami, Iran softened its intonations towards the United States, resuming economic contacts and starting to liberalize the political design. However, Ahmadinejad has reversed this trend. This change should not be interpreted with the new President's fundamentalist views alone. After all, it is not the President who rules the Islamic Republic. The influence of the clerical leadership is stronger both de jure and de facto. Ayatollah Khamenei is not a fanatic. In fact, he was once quite tolerant to Khattami. But in the following years, the theological leadership of Iran found necessary to strengthen Iran's foreign policy stand for acquiring a broader diplomatic maneuver. The commitment to complete the nuclear program – which was initiated yet under the Shah's rule – served to this purpose best of all. It is noteworthy that the nuclear research was not kept in secret as it had been in Pakistan and India. The openness of the program, followed with staunch anti-Western rhetoric, was crucial for providing a maximum commercial success at the market of geopolitics.
A year ago, this author expressed the suspicion that the demonstrative stubbornness of both Washington and Tehran could serve as a cover for bargain. On the eve of the US Presidential elections, the Ayatollahs would daunt Ahmadinejad's ardor and agree to disclose certain details of the nuclear program; in its turn, the US Republican Administration, being forced to admit a failure of its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, would interpret this shift in its own favor, thus possibly gaining an election advantage. While the Republicans prolong their rule in Washington for four more years, Iran would achieve influence in two bordering states in exchange for reluctance from mastering a nuclear bomb and economic preferences from Washington. The latter part of the deal would be also interpreted as a victory of the White House: see Iran democratizing, and US corporations returning! Still, the possibility of a military conflict was not excluded a year ago, as well as today. In case the view that "America is not any longer respected" prevails, the recipe would suggest an illustrative crackdown upon the scapegoat, especially if an alternative candidate for this role is not found. A military strike is also viewed by a number of US experts as the "last but necessary" means for making Iran more amenable in economic affairs, or for its easier territorial disintegration.
In any case, the militarist drumbeat has abruptly ceased from both sides. Reluctance to unleash a war conflict is expressed by both Washington and Tehran. After Iran displayed compliance with IAEA's conditions, this organization admitted that Iran lacked necessary components for constructing a nuke bomb. The longtime fuss seems to be unneeded by the primary fuss-makers.
Russia used the ostensible thaw for settling the contradictions around the Bushehr project. Atomstroyexport's president Sergey Shmatko declared that the financial misunderstanding with Tehran is over, and assured that Russia will complete the first phase of construction of the Bushehr Plant in the nearest time – though desisting to nominate precise timing.
This breather does not necessarily mean that the Iranian problem is not more menacing regional peace. Many wars in human history have started right at the time when the pretext for their unleashing seemed to have vanished. At the same time, the "wind nil" over Iran may suggest that Washington is considering a new explosive game which we even don't suspect of today.
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