March 12, 2008 (the date of publication in Russian)

Grigory Tinsky

THE SIKORSKI SHUTTLE

Polish diplomacy takes lessons from Kissinger

Since the disintegration of he Warsaw Pact, the prospects of Russian-Polish relations have looked pessimistic. At first, the Polish post-Communists deliberately huffed the former "elder brother", mostly from fear of being accused of following Moscow's line; later, Polish rightists huffed Kremlin already from ideological considerations; on their return to power, the post-Communists, for pragmatic reasons of securing special advantages in the EU, continued the same drumbeat; the returning rightists from Jaroslaw Kaczynski's government physically spat in the direction of Moscow, excepting any diplomacy even on the level of the proprieties.

Eventually, common reason overcame tactical considerations and ideological patterns. Last year's snap elections brought success to the rightist-liberal Civic Platform, encouraging Russian analysts with a prospect of a real thaw in the relationship. A revived diplomatic exchange resulted in repeal of Russia's ban for imports of Polish meat, while Poland took a lengthy pause in their talks with Washington on deployment of US ABM facilities on their territory. A newly- established bilateral non-governmental commission was co-chaired by renowned experts from the two states. This process culminated in the February 8 official visit of Poland's Prime Minister Donald Tusk to Moscow. This was the first Russian-Polish summit meeting since Alexander Kwasniewski's trip to Moscow in 2005.

Still, the ice has not yet melted. When Jerzy Hoffman, a classic of Polish cinema, arrived in Moscow to resume the long-disrupted cultural dialogue with his new movie "With Fire and Sword", a screen version of Henryk Sienkiewicz's historical novel, the movie director's ironical characteristic of himself as the first Pole breaking through into Russia "with fire and sword" raised eyebrows: during years of alienation, the audience had got insensitive with good Polish humor.

Tusk's visit, as well as much of Poland's new foreign policy, was coined by Radoslaw Sikorski, Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose diplomatic flexibility looks surprising for Russians, regarding his background of a longtime liaison to US think tanks. In a longer while, it became clear that Sikorski's diplomatic performance largely reproduces the methods of "shuttle diplomacy" he had obviously adopted from the once famous US Secretary of State, Sir Henry Kissinger.

The lessons, taken from the internationally renowned strategist, are as simple as ingenious. In his dialogue with Washington, he displays pertinacity in the issue of ABM deployment, thus sending a positive signal to Moscow, acquiring more sympathies from the Russian side and making the White House nervous. While visiting Russia, he assures the US side of Poland's commitment to fulfill the duties of a true ally, bargaining out delivery of Patriot launchers in a package with the ABM deployment, and arousing alarm this time in Moscow.

This shuttle tactics has enabled Mr. Sikorski to reach most of his objectives. In his talk with US vice-president Dick Cheney, the subject of ABM did not surface at all. This revealed the fact that the US side was actually not prepared for fulfilling the deployment plan.

According to Sikorski's comments, Ellen Tauscher, D-CA, chair of the House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, told him that the funding of ABM deployment depends not only on the US-Polish talks but also on ratification of this endeavor by the Congress which is questionable during the current term, as the Democrats are more lukewarm on the issue than the Republican White House. "I addressed Mrs. Clinton", he added, "but she appeared to be not quite informed on the deal" (speaking in Washington, Sikorski used a Russian expression for "being informed", having no English analogue).

This message, dated January 31, was clearly addressed to Moscow, being delivered a week before the summit meeting. Next day, he meets with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, making clear that the message was addressed to her as well: see, the price is rising; it's high time to accept our conditions!

The price was rising very substantially: the required Patriots cost $2 billion while the ABM deployment was estimated in $1.5 billion. What if the Czechs demand Patriots as well?

In Moscow, Sikorski was reminded by the Russian side that deployment of US missiles would make Poland and Europe a target of Russia's defense systems. In his remarks, he indicated that Poland is a NATO member and is therefore not going to ask permission from Moscow for modernization of its defense potential. This was explained three days before Tusk's arrival – the price being raised at this market as well, and the hosts being told to be more diplomatic with the arriving Prime Minister.

 

THE REAL PURPOSE OF POLISH SMILES

Moscow was truly diplomatic with Donald Tusk. He negotiated with his counterpart Victor Zubkov, President Vladimir Putin and Presidential candidate Dmitry Medvedev. The Russian leader’s conciliatory remark: "Despite our common efforts, we managed to save our relations from complete deterioration" – did not sufficiently impress Tusk's opponents in Warsaw. President Lech Kaczynski, whose rightist party had lost the elections, claimed that Tusk's visit "destroyed the achievements of the previous government", while rightist media sweltered venomous comments on the new Russian-Polish dialogue. However, the arguments of the rightists were perceived by the domestic audience rather as political jealousy.

The real purpose of Poland's friendly gestures towards Kremlin was not in improvement of the Warsaw-Moscow relations. It was rather a broadly highlighted media campaign under the title, "Warsaw rejects the role of a ritual Russophobe", addressed both to Brussels and Washington. Polish strategist Pawel Sweboda, President of Demos Europa Center, revealed more in his piece for Gazeta Wyborcza published February 11:

"Tusk's visit to Moscow was an important message for our European and American partners. They had to be impressed with the fact that Poland is really one of the six largest EU members. While America is regarded as a child of Mars, and Europe a child of Venus, where does Russia originate from? Does it come from Jupiter, the god of thunder and lightning, Pluto, the god of underworld, Mercurius, the god of trade, or not more than a satellite of Mars – Phobos or Deimos?

"Actually, Russia can't be classified in this way, as it is more a condition of spirit than a country as such; it contains the understanding of its ego, encouraged with oil revenues, and at the same time, the feeling of uncertainty and alarm. It purchases equities of European energy companies not for the need of expansion but rather from a desire to pop a leg into any door which could be useful".

Saying this, Mr. Sweboda admitted that relationship with Russia is going to become a major problem of Polish foreign policy, as other matters are clear, including EU membership as a supreme value, and commitment for support of Ukraine on its way to EU and NATO. "With Russia, things are more complicated, as we intervene in the sphere of global policy where balance of forces is at stake, and the role of Russia, along with its implications for Poland, should be correctly assessed".

Thus, the commitment to smoothen the Polish diplomacy towards Russia, both Tusk and Sikorski perform as convinced proponents of Euro-Atlantic cooperation, and openly express that Poland is not going to follow Russia's line.

 

RUSSIA IS NOT MORE AN ENEMY?

Poland and Russia are also divided with the approach to their closest common neighbors, Ukraine and Belarus. Poland considers both as belonging to its own sphere of influence, contending for a role of their guide to EU and NATO. While Ukrainian authorities favor this prospect, Belarus seems to be as distant from this objective as Venezuela. Still, Tusk's government openly expresses its disaccord with EU policy towards Belarus, and offers services of an interpreter to both sides.

This policy is related to the assumption that Russia may commit itself for a closer rapprochement with Europe and NATO, eventually considering this choice as more reasonable. This logic leads Pawel Sweboda to the conclusion that Russia "should not be included in the list of foes though it is not yet in our camp and is not likely to enter it in the nearest time".

"After the debate in Moscow on the ABM issue, this issue is not more an irritating 'red rag' for Moscow as Poland's entry in NATO one was. Russia will undoubtedly use the ABM deployment as a pretext for multiplying its own defense capabilities. Suggesting that ABMs in Poland and Czech are not the last American move, Moscow is correct. Only the further moves of Washington will reveal the real purpose of their deployment, thus probably making other states feeling uncomfortable as well".

 

NEW SURPRISES IN THE ABM DEBATE

Meanwhile, the ABM issue arouses objections from a traditionally calm Norway. At the Vilnius meeting of NATO's defense ministers on February 8, Norway's Anne-Grete Ström-Eriksen quite resolutely claimed that her country "seriously doubts necessity of ABM deployment in Europe". Not being in a position to influence the talks between Washington, Warsaw and Prague, Oslo indicates that its member status in the Euro-Atlantic Council enables to veto integration of the US ABMs into the presently outlined NATO's ABM system.

Until this debate, NATO perceived the ABM project as a trilateral joint venture. However, Norway's remark in Vilnius triggered an open discussion of the question of the possibility of integration of the "missile shield" into NATO's common defense system; the last word is obviously going to be said at the NATO summit in Bucharest.

While Poland has just explained its compliance with the ABM project as an element of its duties of Washington's ally, Norway does not need excuses of this kind, as the decision to oppose the ABM deployment in Eastern Europe was included in 2005 in the program of the ruling coalition on the demand of its member, the Socialist Leftist Party, and therefore can't be revised before the Bucharest meeting.

 

CONFUSION OF COMPETENCE

On March 11, Poland's Prime Minister paid an official visit to Washington, which involved a personal meeting with George W. Bush – supposedly the first and the last during his tenure. On the eve of the visit, Poland's Foreign Ministry issued messages in the perfect style of "shuttle diplomacy":

"Tusk's agenda is going to be focused on deployment of US ABM facilities in Poland, along with the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan and security cooperation. In our diplomacy with Washington, we openly insist that the ABM facilities guarantee more security for Poland, which is possible only in case the United States contribute to modernization of the Polish army. The opportunity that the United States accept Poland's proposal, is still available. Poland is a serious partner, and the United States is a strategic ally. Therefore, we can allow themselves an open and forthright dialogue of sides that realize who owes what to one another". This statement was made on March 7 by Zbigniew Chlebowski, speaker of Civil Platform's faction in the Polish Sejm. Radoslaw Sikorski echoes from Brussels, where he takes part in the meeting of NATO's Foreign Ministers:

"In the ABM issue, we are to behave in a very moderate way. This project is planned for a long-time implementation, and the talks will last for months. The US side has asked us to downsize the talks to the level of military experts. Therefore, the responsibility is laid mostly on our Ministry of Defense. It was the US side which proposed to postpone the decision. I can't exclude the option that after the Presidential elections in November, the White House's plans may change. Richard Holbrooke has just expressed skepticism over the ABM project, emphasizing that both Democratic candidates share the same view. This very complicated issue involves political risks that we can't underestimate".

On the same day, Sikorski delivered one more interview, highly appreciating the view of Daniel Fried, Undersecretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, that the ABM facilities may be deployed yet during George W. Bush's tenure. I am very encouraged with the fact that Mr. Fried, former US Ambassador in Poland, is expressing optimism. Poland would like its approval of deployment of ABM facilities on its territory to be rewarded with US assistance in reinforcement of Polish Armed Forces, especially the anti-missile systems".

After a desperate effort to pressure Warsaw by means of a concerted effort of the diplomatic and expert community, Washington preferred not to make a point of the ABM deployment in Poland, also for the reason of lack of domestic enthusiasm for the project.

Peter Tomar, a renowned US expert, plainly advises Warsaw to give up diplomacy with Washington on this issue or at least postpone it until the end of Bush's tenure. Doubting the menace of Iran for the national security of the United States, not speaking of absurd fears over a North Korea threat, Tomar inquires, "After all, who needs ABMs in Europe?" To his view, the answer is simple: "Those who are going to capitalize from them".

"The Administration of President George W. Bush, along with the Republican-dominated Congress, has once promised unprecedented huge money to the military industry. Only in this year, military expenses are to absorb almost $700 billion, from which Iraq takes "only" $90 billion. Compare with $59 billion for education, $52 billion for health and $43 billion for justice. The US military industry is a rapacious dragon permanently demanding provender of contracts – that actually favor corporate profits and distribution of lucrative appointments".

Almost in accord with Tomar, Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton recently promised to convene – in case of her victory – a special commission for investigating the State Department's ties with "crony" military and other companies that have garnered huge contract profits during Bush's tenure.

Analyzing the foreign and domestic implications of deployment of the "missile shield" in Poland, the White House has obviously decided to slow down this project. A week before Donald Tusk's visit to Washington, Gazeta Wyborcza, with reference to private Washington sources, reported that President Bush had entrusted all the ABM project-related issues to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. According to the Polish paper, this decision was made due to absence of visible results of accord of Pentagon and the Polish negotiations.

Obviously, Pentagon was not planning to combine ABM deployment with modernization of the Polish army. The most ridiculous aspect of the talks is the confusion of coordination of the Washington-Warsaw diplomacy, the US side entrusting the issue to the diplomatic office and the Polish side to the military.

In case Pentagon agreed to satisfy Polish demands, Warsaw would become the greatest beneficiary of US assistance in the world. US military experts grumble about Poland's unwillingness to particularize its demands. According to Gazeta Wyborcza, Pentagon prefers to demonstrate that the disaccord is nothing dramatic. The paper's sources intone that Pentagon might easily revise the very idea of deploying ABM facilities in Europe, searching for alternative options like development of sea- and space-based anti-missile systems.

Regardless from the net result of the bargain, Poland's diplomacy is obviously successful. On the one hand, Warsaw maintains the costly thaw in the relations with Moscow, at the same time trying not to lose the advantage in partnership with Washington. The new US Administration, in case it confirms its interest in the delicate issue, could be easily explained that the accord had not been reached through the fault of Bush's White House. Thus, the game could be played again, the "Sikorsky shuttle" swinging back and forth between the West and the East.

 

THE UNUSED OPPORTUNITIES

What is left in the dry residue of Russian-Polish diplomatic rapprochement? A verbal agreement on resuming joint musical festivals in Zelena Gora, once "festivals of Soviet songs", and a non-visa entry in Kaliningrad Region. Is that much? Certainly, Moscow cannot accept Warsaw's proposals to reshape the North Stream pipeline project by redirecting it along the land via the Baltic States and Poland. In its turn, Poland would hardly rush into peril of a rift with the United States by rejecting the ABM proposal.

One more problem lies in the conflict around the refinery of Mazeikiai, Lithuania, where Russia ceased to ship oil since the facility was purchased by Poland's ORLEN. The change of the route is unprofitable for Russia's Transneft as well, while the possibility of resuming shipment depends also on Moscow's relations with Vilnius.

It is really much easier to deteriorate bilateral relations than to restore them. Certainly, Russia can ignore Poland as it did earlier, and concentrate on relations with Washington and Brussels (where many Russian experts love to travel) – but this approach has already revealed its negative implications. Why not to make Poland a playground for improvement of Russia's international reputation? By establishing a branch of its newly-founded Institute of Democracy and Cooperation in Warsaw, Moscow could irradiate a better image of itself not only in Poland but across other ex-Communist states of Eastern Europe as well. In their turn, the Polish partners would better recognize their own importance for Russia's foreign policy.

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