10.04.2008
April 07, 2008 (the date of publication in Russian)
Alexander Sobko
TURKEY AND IRAN: POSSIBLE PARTNERS?
Does the Moscow-Ankara-Tehran triangle have a future?
At the recent summit in Bucharest, NATO confirmed its commitment for further expansion. The Alliance acquired two new member states, Croatia and Albania, and only the Greek veto prevented Macedonia's entry. Similar bids of Ukraine and Georgia were not rejected; their affiliation to NATO's Membership Action Plan, heavily supported from Washington, being just postponed till December. European members were not adamant in resistance to the US plans of deploying their ABM systems in East European states; in fact, these plans were formally recognized as a NATO project. Specialists from many countries, including US conservative thinkers, admit that these facilities are destined for deterrence of Russia and not the fabulous "rogue states". On this background of an even more articulated anti-Russian approach of the Alliance's majority, Russia should seek alternative connections with major regional powers.
Moscow should certainly realize that its choice is quite narrow. By today, the self-sufficient China has gained a too high political weight to be regarded as an equal partner for Russia. Certain hopes may be associated with Kazakhstan, but this country now prefers a so-called multi-vector policy vis-à-vis global centers of power.
Last week, State Duma's Deputy Speaker Vladimir Zhirinovsky proposed that Russia strike a strategic alliance with both Turkey and Iran. Despite the Vice Speaker's reputation of a political showman, it is well known that he frequently promulgates political approaches that are later adopted by official foreign policy. This particular case looks like that kind of a premature signal indirectly sent by Moscow to Ankara and Tehran.
It is true that Russia's bilateral relations with each of the two supposed allies are developing vividly enough to raise the issue of a long-term agreement. The fact that Russian-Iranian cooperation is acquiring features of strategic partnership is quite obvious. In addition to the joint nuclear plant project in Bushehr, the two sides have just signed a comprehensive agreement between state-run railway companies.
Turkey's membership in NATO and relevant Washington's demands to cease cooperation with the "rogue state" of Iran do not prevent Ankara from close partnership with Tehran in the energy sphere. Last summer, Turkish authorities reported about a bid for development of Southern Pars, Iran's largest oil province, and already in November, Turkey and Iran struck a deal on joint construction of thermal power plants. The recent scandalous affair with exposure of Israeli complicity in violation of embargo by purchase of Iran-planted pistachio nuts from Turkey reveals intimate trade partnership between Ankara and Tehran.
Russia's relations with Turkey have experienced a decline since Ankara rejected the proposal to construct the second phase of the joint Blue Stream pipeline project, preferring the US-designed Nabucco. The implications of this careless move of Turkey was revealed already in the current winter, when Turkmenistan reduced shipments of gas to Iran due to cold weather, while Iran reduced gas supply for Turkey that, in its turn, reduced shipments to Greece and eventually had to address Gazprom for assistance. In this situation, Turkey realized the reliability of the Russian partner, while the EU, particularly Greece, recognized the weak points of Middle Asia-Turkish transit that the Nabucco project was based upon.
Still, the Nabucco project may acquire a "second breath". Despite the abovementioned restrictions for economic cooperation with Iran, Nabucco's masterminds are seeking to return to the original version of the project that suggests involvement of Iran's gas provinces. In this case, the exports flows of Russia and Iranian-Turkish gas will challenge one another – with a supposed benefit for the end-users but to the detriment of both producers and transit nations. The other option is to coordinate energy policies of the three sides and thus to encourage comprehensive trilateral partnership.
Unlike most of East European states that join the EU and NATO and the same time, Turkey, a longtime NATO member, is kept outside the EU. In addition, Sarkozy's France that recently snubbed Ankara on the Armenian issue has not only initiated the Middle East-involving project of the Mediterranean Union but also agreed to join NATO's military operations. Turkey was soothed shortly earlier with a proposal of ABM deployment – but this initiative, targeting the relationship with its closest neighbor Iran, is broadly viewed in the Turkish establishment as a Grecian gift.
In order to soothe Turkey even more, Washington officially supported the anti-Kurdish operations of the Turkish army in Northern Iraq. However, this stance may change to the opposite after a highly probable transition of power in Washington to the Democratic Party that is likely to take the pro-Kurdish line.
For this and other reasons, the United States is a far less reliable partner for Turkey than it used to be for decades before. Besides, Turkey is influenced from neighboring Arab states where the anti-American sentiment is increasing.
It is noteworthy that in mid-1990s, the Islamist government of Necmettin Erbakan was about to suspend membership in NATO. Turkey may use the precedent of year 1966, when de Gaulle's France abandoned NATO's military bodies for a period of thirty years, maintaining membership in the Alliance's Political Council. Such a move would be highly appreciated in the Islamic community which Turkey views itself as a part of. In fact, the Turkish establishment is mature enough for an independent geopolitical strategy, as an alternative to both the EU and the Mediterranean Union.
Therefore, partnership with Moscow and Tehran is a quite possible option for Ankara. Turkey's commitment for moving in this direction may be reflected in the outcome of the currently announced tender for construction of a nuclear plant. In case Russia enters the Turkish nuclear program, the prospects of strategic cooperation will become more promising.
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