03.07.2008
June 30, 2008 (the date of publication in Russian)
Alexander Rublev
THE MUNICH PACT REVISITED
What is common between Prague-1938 and Pristina-2008?
The present development in the Balkans reminds of one anniversary of this year that is quite unlikely to be broadly celebrated. On September 30, 1938, Great Britain and France signed the infamous Munich Pact with Nazi Germany.
At that time, the two major European democracies refrained from providing guarantees of sovereignty to Czechoslovakia, actually forcing Prague to concede the region of Sudetes to Hitler. These territories contained not only strategic military objects but also strategic fortifications (the Czech Maginot line) protecting Prague from the invasion of the potential aggressor.
According to historian William Schirer, "a flourishing industrial power was fouled up and torn into parts during a night. Czechoslovakia's rail and highway network was disrupted, along with telegraph and telephone lines. The country was losing 66% of its reserves of black??/ coal, 80% of brown coal, 86% of raw materials for chemistry, 80% of cement, 80% of textiles, and 70% of timber.
In fact, London and Paris were giving away the whole Czechoslovakia, as the country was losing its viability. The French and the British perfectly realized that the country, established by Masarik and Benes, was doomed. Still, they preferred to overlook the fact that the Munich agreements were ruining the whole post-1918 system of international legal agreements, creating preconditions for revision of other European borders and eventually, opening the way for a new world war.
The behavior of Western powers vis-à-vis Serbia in 2008 arouses striking parallels with the style in which Western democracies dealt with Czechoslovakia in 1938.
For many years, Western democracies encouraged Prague, promising support in case of aggression, but eventually, gave it away to the Nazi. In the same way, Milosevic's regime was originally guaranteed support by George H.W. Bush. But after a while, Washington decided that a counterweight to Germany in the Balkans is unnecessary, and Serbia collapsed to the Dayton agreements and then to Kosovo's secession.
Before Munich, Czechoslovakia was a regional power. After Munich, it was not any longer a subject of polity. The same is true about Serbia that once played a key political role in the Balkans – while its current e, Czechoslovakia also lost legitimacy of political power. President Eduard Benes was forced to resin, being replaced by collaborationists, admitting any concession to the aggressor. In Serbia, a similar process develops in two stages, first victimizing Milosevic and later Kostunica.
The annexation of the Sudetes became a pretext for the division of Czechoslovakia into two parts – the "protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia" and Tiso's marionette regime in Slovakia. Serbia is faced with the same option. Actually losing Kosovo in 1999, Belgrade later lost Montenegro as well. After the change of Kosovo's legal status, Serbia may expect secession of Vojvodina, Sanjak, and Presevo.
All those parallels are as plain as a pikestaff. The decisions on the Sudetes and Kosovo were made without involvement of Russia and contrary to its will. In this way, the Western powers demonstrated that they were not going to countenance with Russia, and don't view Russia as the bearing construction of then-European (and presently global) collective security.
Conveying the Sudetes to the Reich, the Western democracies were motivated not only with the desire to buy off Berlin but also with the decision to canalize the energy of the conquerors further to the East, with the following perspective of establishing a unified front against the USSR. This consideration was sufficient for London and Paris, though they realize that by giving away the Sudetes, they offer the Nazi a convenient stronghold for future operations.
Conceding Kosovo to Albanian separatists, the United States and their European allies expected to establish relations with the Islamic community, and to re-canalize its confrontational potential to the Slavonic-Orthodox Church and thus eventually to Russia. Separating Kosovo from Serbia, NATO signaled to Islamic radicals: attack Russia, concentrate on Chechnya, as you and we have common objectives in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The underground activity of anti-Russian guerillas in Ingushetia proves that this message is still in force.
Dissecting Yugoslavia and Serbia, US strategists openly admitted that they were reckoning with a small copy of Russia. Since the emergence of Huntington's doctrine, Serbia had been viewed as a potential ally of Russia, at least in the long run. The historical connections of the two nations, and sympathies expressed to Russia by a large number of Serbs, served as additional evidence for this judgment.
Similar motivations and calculations were once made vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia. The Czechs were not just fed to sharks but punished for their sympathy to Russians that is not quite obvious for those who started studying history since 1968.
Since the beginning of the XIX century, Prague served as the center of the Panslavonic movement. Seeking to get rid of the oppression from the Habsburgs, Czechs were then looking at St.Petersburg, hoping to achieve national independence with Russian assistance. During World War I, Czechs refused to fight on the side of the Habsburgs and massively shifted to the Russian side. The units of the Czech Corps, formed in Russia, fought against Austro-Hungarian troops. In summer 1917, they withstood the Austrian offensive in Western Ukraine in the period when Russian army units were overwhelmed with revolutionary anarchy.
In 1922, Czechoslovakia de facto recognized the USSR. In May 1935, the agreement on mutual assistance was ratified by the parliaments of two countries – a year before the French-Russian treaty. Eduard Benes, elected President in 1935, propagated the idea of gradual transformation of national capitalism into "Slavonic socialism" with planned economy, collective property for means of production and "regulated democracy", trying to synthesize the stronger sides of Western economies and the USSR, maintaining permanent connections with Joseph Stalin and other Soviet leaders. Besides, the Czech leader was a convinced Russophile and did not conceal his sympathy to the Russian people. In Transcarpatia that found itself under Czech jurisdiction after World War I, Russian was used as an official language until the German-Austrian intervention.
The relations, established between Moscow and Prague in 1935, were unique for the "besieged fortress" of the Soviet Union. The relations with this country were more cordial than with any other state of Europe. Therefore, it is essential to realize that while signing the Munich Pact, London and Paris were not just getting rid of ballast, but cold-bloodedly eliminated the state that could potentially become a Soviet ally. This assumption was correct: in 1943, when the outcome of the war was yet unclear, Benes became the first of East European leaders to sign an agreement on partnership with the Soviets.
Despite the distance of seventy years, we clearly see that the West is using the same approach towards Russia and its – even potential – allies as that applied in the "Munich era". On the example of Kosovo, we see that this strategy does not accept those who try, like Benes, to pursue a multi-vector policy, cooperating both with the West and Russia.
The risky political choice, made by Europe, is fraught with revisiting the post-Munich history – with all the corresponding consequences.
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