24.08.2008
August 23, 2008 (the date of publication in Russian)
Grigory Tinsky
POLAND: WITH THE SHIELD OR ON THE SHIELD?
The Polish-US ABM agreement is easier to sign than to implement
The United States of America has undertaken its first real political countermove at the face of the military defeat of their ally Georgia. After ten days of irritated comments and unsuccessful attempts to urge Russia to cease the extermination of the Georgian military infrastructure after Tbilisi's assault on South Ossetia, Washington convinced Warsaw to sign the long-discussed agreement on deployment of the third position area of the US global ABM system, ostensibly destined for protection against a supposed transcontinental strike from Iran – the timing of the deal in fact proving, as President Dmitry Medvedev plainly admitted, that the real potential adversary, from the beginning, had been identified with in Russia.
Washington's move is understandable, regarding not only the concerns related to military influence in the Black Sea region but also the presidential campaign, in which the incumbent administration desperately needs evidence of foreign policy success. In fact, as US experts broadly admit, the American establishment was snubbed by Russia for the first time since the disintegration of the USSR. Having neither economic nor military possibility to allow itself massive countermeasures, the United States found itself in the shoes as an insolvent debtor who had issued an uncovered acceptance to its devoted ally that had dispatched the third largest contingent to Iraq after Washington and London.
By that moment, the talks over of ABM deployment had been sluggishly continued by Washington and Warsaw since 2005, with no visible perspectives for a success, the Polish side trying to bargain out more favorable conditions of the deal.
The eventually signed agreement, displayed as a strategic achievement of US foreign policy, did not in fact favor US interests in Eastern Europe. Despite heavy attempts to intimidate the Poles with the picture of the revived Russian threat, Washington has failed to consolidate the Warsaw establishment. Eventually caving in to the pressure from the senior partner, the Polish ruling circles are still split over the issue.
The deal was signed by US State Secretary Condoleezza Rice, who looked relaxed and beaming with benevolence: having just returned from the hectic summit of the NATO Defense Ministers in Brussels, she finally enjoyed an opportunity to improve her personal reputation of a negotiator. The photo opportunity among Polish ministers served as a material evidence of her own – and America's – persisting influence in Europe.
Beyond disappointment with the concession made by the Polish Government, the Russian audience should first assess the real implications of the deal. What, when and under which conditions is going to be constructed close to the borders of Russia and Belarus?
The first two position areas of the global ABM system of the United States are centered at Fort Greely, Alaska, and at the Wanderberg base, California. The whole system is managed from the central base of the US missile forces in Colorado. According to the official explanations of pentagon, the system is destined to prevent sporadic missile attacks of the potential adversary. At the same time, the system is helpless before a massive missile assault.
Moreover, the efficiency of the whole system is still under question. The first ABM tests, conducted in 2003, turned a fiasco: only 24 of the 32 launched missiles hit the targets. Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering, Director of Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency, then acknowledged in an interview to New York Times that the system is yet "not perfect". At that time, the Bush administration was planning to complete the deployment by 2013.
Bush's planning, however, may be influenced by economic and political factors. As soon as VP Dick Cheney, the chief lobbyist of the project estimated in a sum of $1trln, leaves the White House, the US military industrial corporations will have to seek for a new log-roller in the new administration. Regardless from the outcome of the US elections, it will be not easy to gain approval for this huge spending from the US House of Representatives, presently dominated with the Democratic Party. In the current year, the MPs already slashed a half of finances allocated for production of a radar station and 10 intercepting missiles for the ABM facilities in Poland and Czechia for which Pentagon requested $712mln.
In order to put the newly-signed ABM agreement into force, the United States are to achieve approval from the parliaments of Poland and Czech Republic, along with proof of efficiency of the system from the US Department of Defense.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates has not yet provided the required expertise. The efficiency of the ABM system is doubted in the US Congress as well. On the day when the deal was signed, Rep. Ellen Tauscher, chair of the ABM Control Commission, addressed the White House with an appeal to "refrain from digging in Polish and Czech soil and concentrate on research and feasibility studies".
Conceding to the pressure from Washington, the Polish Government relied upon the public opinion which, in its turn, was significantly influenced by the interpretation of the latest events in Transcaucasia not only in US but also in European media. According to the published results of polls, the share of the population, favoring deployment of US ABM facilities in their own country, increased from 35-40 to 60 per cent within a week. Admitting that the deal on ABM deployment favors Poland's relations with the United States (85%) and the European Union (a remarkably high 71%), the respondents, at the same time, admitted that the deployment increases the threat, emerging from Russia (62%) as well as from international terrorism (51%). Thus, the assessment of the Polish majority is ambiguous and reflects rather anxiety than commitment. This attitude may change in the nearest future, influencing the outcome of debates in the parliament. The ambiguity of the popular reaction to the ABM deployment should be thoroughly analyzed and monitored by Russian diplomats and considered by mass media designed for foreign broadcasting.
It is also noteworthy that the signed agreement does not revise the earlier decision of the Polish Government to wait until the outcome of the US Presidential elections. Even President Lech Kaczynski, the major proponent of the deal, acknowledged in his August 21 interview that the agreement is supposed to be ratified in January 2009, on the eve of the inauguration of the new President of the United States. Thus, the future of the deal will be determined not by the Pentagon planners but by the American voters.
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